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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
cases and the standards to which professional people in general are held
would seem to belie this construction.
It would seem that the immunity afforded by the statute in the
instant case has been extended too far. The privilege (including the usual
immunity statutes) traditionally only protect answers which injure in a
penal sense. The effect of the decision has extended the statutory words
"penalty or forfeiture" to an area more civil in nature. "The privilege
against self-incrimination is a rule of necessity beyond which it should
not be extended; its use should not be considered as affording the witness
a certificate of good character."' 1  Thus, in the words of Professor Wig-
more, "The privilege cannot be enforced without enforcing crime, but
that is a necessary evil inseparable from it and not a reason for its exist-
ence. We should regret the evil and not magnify it by approval."' 6
Sheldon J. Schlesinger
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION - PENDENCY OF APPEAL AS
TOLLING STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Petitioner was awarded a workmen's compensation claim, but it was
reversed by the full Industrial Commission. The Circuit Court and the
Florida Supreme Court' affirmed the Commission's order. Thereupon,
the petitioner attempted to have the Commission review the cause.
Held, the Commission had no jurisdiction because of petition for review
was filed over one year after entry of the Commission's original reversal. 2
The pendency of the petitioner's appeal from such order did not toll the
running of the limitation statute. Davis v. Combination Awning &
Shutter Co., 62 So.2d 742 (Fla. 1953).
Since modification and review statutes arc based upon statuton'
rights rather than constitutional rights," the courts generally have inter-
preted them very strictly. 4 'llcre are two ways in which the courts treat
the time limits in the review statutes-as a jurisdictional question" or as
15. Scholl v. Bell, 125 K%. 750, 102 S.W. 248, 261 (1907).
16. WIMORFt, ED NcE § 2251 p. 317 (3d ed. 1940).
1. Davis v. Combination Awning & Shutter Co., 487 So.2d 436 (lia. 1950).
2. FLA. STAT. §§ 440.27, 440.28 (1951).
3. City of Miami v. Saco, 156 Fla. 634, 24 So.2d 115 (1945). See FL-. STAT.§440.27 for the statutory conditions that must be complied with in Florida for review
of a compensation award.
4. Winrod v. McFadden Publications, 187 F.2d 180 (7th Cir. 1951); Mitchel
v. Town of Niagec, 51 So.2d 198 (Miss. 1951); Thomsen v. Null, 248 S.V.2d 6 (Mo.
1952); Wills v. Stineman Coal & Coke Co., 170 Pa. Super. 446, 87 A.2d 104 (1952);
Bucker v. Kapp Bros., 110 Pa. Super. 65, 167 Atd. 652 (1933); cf. Mallory v. Pitts-
burgh Coal Co., 162 Pa. Super. 541, 58 A.2d 804 (1948). See Young v. McKenzie,
46 So.2d 184 (Fla. 1950).
5. Manrose v. Miami Shipbuilding Corp., 156 Mba. 402, 23 So.2d 733 (1945);
See Concord Realty Corp. v. Romano, 30 So.2d 485 (I-la. 1947).
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a time limitation question." In the former treatment the courts usually
determine that if the time limit has run the Commission has lost juris-
diction over the case and cannot even look to the merits involved.7 In
the latter view the defendant-employer must plead the time period as
an affirmative defense, thus giving it the character of a statute of limita-
tions." If the time period is treated as a jurisdictional question-such
as it is in Florida-the problem arises as to whether an appeal will suspend
the time limit.
Generally, if a party is prevented from exercising his legal remedy by
the pendency of legal proceedings, i.e., an appeal, the time thus consumed
should not be counted against him.9  However, the opposite result is
usually reached when the legal proceeding relied upon to toll the statute
was revoked by the party's own acts."' Likewise, when the denial of a
claim has resulted because of some jurisdictional matter going to the
merits of the causet (such as a finding that the injury was not a direct
result of the employment) -' and the time period has run, so that the
Commission's order is final, it has been held that there can be no rehear-
lig or review of such order.1 a When there is a choice of remedies, the
fact that a party selects one remedy does not toll limitations as against
an action based upon another rcmedy.'' Sonic jurisdictions take the view,
however, that until the correctness of an award is finally detennined by
the appellate courts, the limitations period does not begin to run.' 5
The instant case seems to follow the doctrine set down by the New
6. Sager V. General Electric Co., 269 App. Div. 801, 55 NY.S.2d 138 (3rd
Dept. 1945); cf. Colonial Insurance Co. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 27 Cal.2d 438,
164 P.2d 492 (1945) (the review statute is construed as a statute of limitations which
may be waived).
7. See note 5 srra,
8. Colonial Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 27 Cal.2d 437, 164 P.2d 490(1945). To determine tile scope of the local review or modification procedures, together
with the time when such relief must be soight, the statutes of the various jurisdictions
must be consulted.
9. State v. Stein, 133 Fla. 241, 83 So, 753 (1938); Whipps v. Kling Bros. &
Co., 191 Okla. 163, 127 P.2d 166 (1942); Sec Berkstresser v. State Vorkmen's Ins.
Fund 140 Pa. Super. 237, 14 A,2d 225 (1942) (statute was tolled to prevent part;'
guilty of misconduct fron1 setting it up as a bar).
10. Brink v. Kansas City, 217 S.W.2d 307 (Mo. 1949); Ottenad v. Mount Hiope
Cemetery & Mausoleumn Co., 176 S.W.2d 62 (\o. 1943); cf, Broyles v. State Per-
sonnel Board, 42 Cal. App.2d 303, 108 P.2d 714 (1941); Bostick v. 'Heard, 164 S.W.
34 (Tex. 1914).
11. Leeper v. Logan Iron & Steel Co., 131 Pa. Super. 172, 198 Atl. 489 (1938);
cf. Gleyze v. Hale Coal Co., 149 Pa. Super. 18. 26 A.2d 141 (1942); see Davis v. Artley
Construction Co., 154 Fla. 481, 497, 18 So.2d 255, 259 (1944). But see Hlammnond-
Knowlton v. United States, 121 F.2d 192, 194 (2d Cir. 1941).
12, Stromberg Motor Device Co. v. Industrial Comn'n, 305 I11. 619, 137 N.E. 462
(1922); ef. Weymner v. Industrial Comm'n, 404 111. 271, 88 N.E.2d 841 (1949).
13. Lopez v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 71 Ariz. 212, 225 P.2d 702 (1950);
Lauderdale v, Industrial Comnmn, 60 Ariz. 443, 130 P.2d 449 (19431. But cf \rest
Cast Fruit Co. v. Hackney, 102 Fla. 1060, 136 So. 699 (1931); loward v. Murdock,
83 Ga. App. 536, 64 S.E.2d 221 (1951).
14. D'Artenay v. Hauser, 138 Cal. App. 39, 31 P.2d 460 (1934); Brink v.
Kansas City, 358 Mo. 845, 217 S.W.2d 507 (1949).
15. Reid v. Department of Labor & Inhstries, 96 P.2d 492 (Wash. 1939);
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Jersey Supreme Court," stating that a party may prosecute an appeal
from the Commission's finding or seek a review on a change of conditions
or facts, but he is not entitled to both remedies. Although workmen's
compensation statutes are to be construed liberally in favor of the work-
man,'7 the Florida Supreme Court was very reluctant about changing the
meaning and intent of the legislative act controlling the procedure by
which the benefits are conferred upon injured employees.
This case was on of first impression in Florida. Although the
decision may seem harsh, the case is in line with the many others estab-
lishing the procedure for appealing decisions of a commission's order.
The Florida attorney should take full cognizance of the consequences of
not suspending his appeal if he feels he has new facts of a nature sufficient
to secure a reversal of the Commission's rejection order.
Lawrence J.. Meyer
Hunter v. Department of Labor & Industries, 68 P.2d 224 (Wash. 1937). But cf.
Leschner v. Department of Labor & Industries, 185 P.2d 113 (Wash. 1947); State
cx rel Stone v. Olinger, 108 P.2d 630 (XWash. 1940).
16. C. V. Hill Co. v. Drake, 14 N.J. Misc. 95, 182 Al. 480 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
17. The Supreme Court of Florida has ruled that the Workmen's Compensation
Act should be construed liberally, and all doubts resolved in claimant's favor. See
S. 1-. Kress Co. v. Burkes, 153 Fla. 868, 16 So.2d 106 (1944); Fidelity & Cas. Co.
of New York v. Moore, 143 I-Ia. 103, 196 So. 495 (1940).
